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ABOLISH MUNICIPAL COURTS: A RESPONSE  
TO PROFESSOR NATAPOFF†
Brendan D. Roediger∗
What are you still doing here?  Are you telling me nobody loves you 
enough to come up with two hundred dollars? 
These were the first words, spoken by a judge, that I heard in a 
municipal court.  Arriving uncharacteristically early for a scheduled 
hearing, I walked midway into a meeting where a line of Black men in 
handcuffs stood before a judge and guard.  The judge aimed his cruel 
query toward one of the men.  I never spoke with him and I have no 
way of discovering the alleged misdeed that triggered the machine that 
relocates Black men from their homes to the jail in St. Ann, Missouri.  
The possibilities are endless and endlessly mundane: speeding, jaywalk-
ing, a half of a blunt, or the dreaded failure to comply.  Some of us, 
when making well-rehearsed equal protection arguments about pretrial 
detention, are fond of saying that he was jailed because of his inability 
to make an arbitrary monetary payment or some variation on this.  I 
do not think we believe it.  He was there because he was Black, because 
the cops put him there, and because his everyday existence was subject 
to seemingly endless mechanisms of external management. 
Eight years later, an email regarding a brave client from a municipal 
judge helped drive that point home.  The judges email said: She obvi-
ously needs more help than just legal help for traffic court.  She needs 
sterilization.1
Along with some dear friends, I have spent much of the last decade 
in absurd legal fights with criminal (or quasi-criminal) municipal courts.  
Here are just a few examples of the things we argue over: 
Can cities use bail and incarceration to extort cash from poor people?2
Can city courts make up additional costs out of thin air and pocket 
the cash?3

 Responding to Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964
(2021). 
∗ Director of Civil Advocacy Clinic and Professor, St. Louis University School of Law.  Thanks 
to Ashton Dietrich, SLU Law Class of 2020, for her insights and assistance. Thanks also to Julian 
Roediger and Warren Zevon for the soundtrack. 
1 Email from Dan Leslie, Mun. J. of Pacific, Mo., to author (Feb. 9, 2015, 3:32 PM) (on file with 
the Harvard Law School Library). 
2 See Class Action Complaint at 1, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 15-cv-00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 
8, 2015). 
3 See Wann v. City of St. Louis, No. 1422-CC-10272, 2016 WL 8136348 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 18, 
2016). 
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Can rich people pay for a special municipal court that only prose-
cutes homeless people and releases them on the condition that they clean 
up after major municipal events?4
I say all of this not to position myself as a municipal court expert  
a rather terrifying concept  but to explain that my sincere desire for 
their elimination was born primarily from witnessing what they do. 
Professor Alexandra Natapoff has done us all a favor by turning her 
talents toward municipal courts.  The descriptive portion of Criminal 
Municipal Courts fills in enormous gaps in our comprehension of the 
current scope of municipal criminal justice administration across the 
country.5  Her picture of the bottom of the penal pyramid is, as always, 
impressive in scope and detail.6  She is clearheaded about the distortions 
of justice in these courts and the limits of the liberal reforms she ulti-
mately recommends.7
This Response does not question Natapoffs picture of the localized 
criminal court but takes issue with her insistence on imagining its fu-
ture.8  This insistence is a phenomenon we might call progressive legal 
legitimation.  By this I mean an approach that proceeds to prescribe 
from the traditional medication list of liberal reforms (substantive, 
procedural, and democratizing) without grappling with whether a sys-
tem or apparatus is so inextricably bound up with the maintenance of 
race and class hierarchy that it should be demolished.  This is the ap-
proach that allows not just Natapoff but so many of us to honestly de-
scribe and thoroughly critique brutal racist apparatuses like municipal 
courts, but to then conclude that they have democratic import9 and 
need greater resources.10
What follows is an attempt to approach the problem of municipal 
courts from an alternative critical abolitionist perspective.  I say prob-
lem here rather than phenomenon because in such an approach [o]ur 
starting point is neither law nor critical law but the punished.11  My 
clients unanimously view municipal courts as a problem and not a  
phenomenon.12

4 See Bogan v. Bonner, No. 044-00250, at 34 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 24, 2004). 
5 See Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964, 9741010
(2021). 
6 Id. at 972. 
7 See id. at 1045. 
8 See id. at 1046. 
9 Id. at 1047.
10 Id. at 1046.
11 PETER LINEBAUGH, THE LONDON HANGED: CRIME AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, at xxv (2d ed. 2003). 
12 For an account of municipal courts and municipal policing from the perspective of their vic-
tims, see generally Thomas B. Harvey & Janae Staicer, Policing in St. Louis: I Feel Like a  
Runaway Slave Sometimes, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN THE UNITED
STATES 39 (Tamara Rice Lave & Eric J. Miller eds., 2019).
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The structure of the Response proceeds in three Parts and a conclu-
sion.  In the first Part, I provide some brief thoughts on abolitionism as 
praxis within law.  In the second Part, I lay out a history of local courts 
as imbricated with racial capitalism.13  In the third Part, I argue that 
municipal courts today are best understood not as a democratic juridical 
apparatus but as a part of modern police bureaucracy. 
I. NOTES ON THE ABOLITIONIST ALTERNATIVE
I dont want an alternative to that.  I want you to leave people the 
hell alone. 
 Mariame Kaba14
As I argue for the complete elimination of municipal courts, it has 
been suggested that a few words about law and abolitionism are appro-
priate.  I am an abolitionist and a lawyer.  I try with varying degrees of 
success to be both at the same time.  For me, in practice, this means 
attempting to protect clients from state power and working with organ-
izers interested in fundamentally shifting power toward my clients and 
away from the state.  In the most basic sense, this work boils down to 
the following: 
Demystifying: Explaining what a legal system or apparatus actually does 
(as opposed to what it says it does). 
Delegitimizing: Explaining why it does what it does (as opposed to why it 
says it does what it does). 
Disempowering/Dismantling: Collectively implementing interventions that 
move us closer to the elimination of the system or apparatus  interventions 
that ideally diminish suffering while weakening the system or apparatus. 
Dreaming: Imagining (not reimagining) ways of collective existence.15
I start with this explanation of elementary abolitionist practice be-
cause, while I fall into that category of people who feel some excitement 
at the publication of serious and brilliant abolitionist perspectives in 

13 Racial capitalism refers not to a type of capitalism but to an understanding of capitalism 
and its resultant structures as racialized from inception and proceeding accordingly.  See CEDRIC
J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM 23 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2000) (1983); Robin D.G. Kelley, What 
Did Cedric Robinson Mean by Racial Capitalism?, BOS. REV. (Jan. 12, 2017), http:// 
bostonreview.net/race/robin-d-g-kelley-what-did-cedric-robinson-mean-racial-capitalism 
[https://perma.cc/YL3G-HQBC] (explaining that capitalism emerged within the feudal order and 
flowered in the cultural soil of a Western Civilization already thoroughly infused with racialism). 
14 Josie Duffy Rice & Clint Smith, Justice in America Episode 20: Mariame Kaba and Prison 
Abolition, THE APPEAL (Mar. 20, 2019), https://theappeal.org/justice-in-america-episode-20- 
mariame-kaba-and-prison-abolition [https://perma.cc/8CAF-8BVX]. 
15 A whole world of scholarship across and against disciplines undermines carceral and police 
logic.  For a useful starting point, see generally Prison Abolition Syllabus 2.0, AFR. AM. INTELL.
HIST. SOCY: BLACK PERSPS. (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.aaihs.org/prison-abolition-syllabus-2-0 
[https://perma.cc/6Z5W-KWSL]. 
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major law journals over the last two years, I remain somewhat afraid of 
abolitionism as legal theory.16  Few things encounter the rule of law and 
come away unscathed.17  Law is a space where even the most hardened 
materialism, grounded in radical movements and mutual aid, tends to 
give way to defensive idealism or reformism. Law demands that you 
explain yourself on its (universal) terms.  Even more troubling, when-
ever truly cornered, Law demands its own replication: We understand 
your concerns, and perhaps we are ruining too many lives, but tell us 
precisely what structure you would build in place of ours.  Law hears 
abolitionist alternative and imagines a new apparatus, similar in form, 
ready for co-optation. 
In White Reconstruction, Dylan Rodríguez asserts that the praxis 
of abolition embraces an overarching, internally complex struggle for 
modalities of human existence that are unapologetically free from the 
systems, epistemologies, and institutionalities of gendered anti-Black 
and racial-colonial dehumanization.18  The emphasis on free draws 
us to the praxiss dual function here  to the desire to be materially 
independent from the mechanisms of dehumanization and simultane-
ously untethered from their ideological underpinnings.  Abolitionism 
seeks to destroy, and abolitionism seeks to build, but it does not seek to 
replace that which is destroyed.  It is not in search of an abolitionist 
security apparatus or an abolitionist punishment apparatus. 
I often ask my students to think creatively about reducing the harms 
our clients experience in local courts.  In my city, like many others, most 
police interactions and low-level cases involve motor vehicles and Black 
drivers.  If I suggest we attack this problem as builders of new systems, 
some students invariably propose a grassroots movement to construct a 
public transport system that reliably gets people where they need to 

16 Legal scholarship influenced by penal and police abolitionism is, of course, significantly older 
than this and builds upon decades of work by critical race and feminist theorists.  That said, it is a 
fact that legal scholarship completely missed the popular abolitionist moment of the early 1970s  
a period when even mainstream newspapers discussed abolition regularly.  These past two years 
have seen remarkable examples of abolitionist scholarship in elite journals.  See generally, e.g., 
Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 (2018); Paul Butler, 
Locking Up My Own: Reflections of a Black (Recovering) Prosecutor, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1983
(2019); Patrisse Cullors, Abolition and Reparations: Histories of Resistance, Transformative Justice, 
and Accountability, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (2019); Daniel Farbman, Resistance Lawyering, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 1877 (2019); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 1613 (2019); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court, 2018 Term  Foreword: Abolition  
Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2019); Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition as Praxis of Human 
Being: A Foreword, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (2019); Angel E. Sanchez, In Spite of Prison, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1650 (2019). 
17 For a wonderfully short and simple description of this phenomenon, see THOMAS
MATHIESEN, SILENTLY SILENCED: ESSAYS ON THE CREATION OF ACQUIESCENCE IN
MODERN SOCIETY 1617 (2004).
18 DYLAN RODRÍGUEZ, WHITE RECONSTRUCTION 57 (2021). 
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go.  Without the necessity of driving, they argue, these police interac-
tions and the cases that follow them will disappear.  Additionally, this 
movement would build community power, improve climate outcomes, 
and generally improve human welfare. All of this is true.  But if that is 
the case, I ask them, why are so many thoughtful and committed com-
munity organizers spending their days trying to close one build-
ing?19  The answer, of course, is that those organizers know that over 
any substantial period, the law will figure out how to fill its buildings  
jails, courthouses, and prisons. 
This is perhaps all a long way of saying that it is okay to be against 
things.  If we are serious about disrupting the generational reproduction 
of the racial social order, we are going to have to learn to let go.  Our 
allegiance to the governing structures of our time  the only structures 
we truly know  must give.  This piece does not attempt to imagine a 
ready replacement for municipal courts because the racialized manage-
ment of everyday life through surveillance and petty regulatory regimes 
does not demand replacement. 
II. HOW THE MODERN MUNICIPAL COURT CAME TO BE
History is featured sparsely in Criminal Municipal Courts.  This is 
likely because a detailed history would be nearly impossible to write on 
a national scale.  But Natapoff ultimately concerns herself with the fu-
ture of the municipal court, offering that the fullest response to munic-
ipal court dysfunction is to raise its institutional profile and status and 
asserting that the courts have innate potential for local accountabil-
ity.20  As a rule, the future makes the past relevant. 
Europeans brought with them to North America the justice of the 
peace, the magistrate, and similar local systems.21  These were among 
the first coercive state structures implemented by colonists as settlement 
patterns deepened.22  Prefiguring by many years the specialization of 
the courts during the Progressive Era, specially appointed justices of the 
peace supplanted existing local indigenous legal traditions, asserting ju-
risdiction over native tribes.23  Special slave court[s] operated in 

19 See The Campaign to Close the Workhouse, CLOSE THE WORKHOUSE, https://www. 
closetheworkhouse.org/home [https://perma.cc/N2LZ-JSLV] (calling for the closure of a St. Louis 
jail). 
20 Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1046. 
21 See Erwin C. Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 253, 
258 (1967).   
22 See Yasu Kawashima, Jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts over the Indians in Massachusetts, 
16891763, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 532, 542 (1969). 
23 See id. at 54243. 
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Southern and mid-Atlantic colonies.24  These structures originally mir-
rored European justice systems but quickly adapted to the necessities of 
settler societies and the expanding system of chattel slavery. 
Professor Laura Edwardss The People and Their Peace makes a few 
appearances in Criminal Municipal Courts.25  It is wielded to provide 
historical grounding for Natapoffs conclusion that municipal courts 
themselves emerged, in the colonial period, from democratic impulses 
and are thus now sites of democratic possibility.26  Natapoffs contention 
is worth quoting in its entirety: Edwards writes that post-Revolutionary 
local justices of the peace  the precursors to modern municipal 
courts  represented not some quaint, folksy exception to a formalized 
rational body of state law but rather a profound expression of local 
democratic impulses and Revolutionary commitments to legal and po-
litical accountability.27
Edwardss work explores postRevolutionary War local legal sys-
tems in North and South Carolina.  In her citation of Edwardss text, 
Natapoff substitutes the phrase justices of the peace for Edwardss 
original local legal practice.28  This fundamentally changes what  
Edwards is articulating.  Edwards argues that there was participation 
in the legal system, not that the legal system was somehow inherently 
participatory in a democratic sense.  Edwards offers that [t]he compul-
sory nature of localized law magnified the brutalities of a social order 
based in stark inequalities.29 The People and Their Peace unearths a 
complicated story about local systems that reproduced and maintained 
racial, class, and gender hierarchies in both intentional and unexpected 
ways.30  To be sure, an unexpected result was the degree to which people 
situated at all levels of this violent social hierarchy participated in the 
system.31  But Edwards never loses sight of the fact that the primary 
objective was the maintenance of order (the peace) and this required 
the management of human beings  including those human beings 
deemed property by law.  If this was democracy, and Edwards never 
argues it was, it was Herrenvolk democracy.32

24 Surrency, supra note 21, at 268. 
25 E.g., Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1023 & n.364 (citing LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND
THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE
POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH 5 (2009)). 
26 See id. 
27 Id. (quoting EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 5). 
28 EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 5. 
29 Id. at 7172. 
30 See id. at 103. 
31 See id. 
32 Cf. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 61 (1971) (de-
fining Herrenvolk democracies as regimes . . . that are democratic for the master race but tyrannical 
for the subordinate groups (quoting PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM 1718
(1967))). 
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Natapoff understandably centers Progressive Era reforms as foun-
dational to the modern municipal court, primarily relying on Professor 
Michael Willrichs City of Courts.  As in the case of Edwards, Natapoff 
uses Willrichs work to construct a historical narrative that associates 
municipal courts with democratic experimentation.33  It is true that the 
modern municipal court phenomenon was largely constructed in the 
Progressive Era, and that municipal courts were sites of administrative 
experimentation in Chicago and elsewhere.34  This experimentation 
marked an expansive turn from municipal enforcement fixated predom-
inantly on vagrancy.35  But was this democracy and, if so, what sort?  
Such experiments need to be evaluated not just in terms of whether they 
were less horrific than what preceded them but in terms of what they 
were intended to do. 
Willrichs assertion that municipal courts became laboratories of 
progressive democracy is striking, but more striking is Natapoffs fail-
ure to explain what exactly he meant by progressive democracy.   
Willrich argues: Merging the authority of the criminal law with the 
disciplinary techniques of social work, welfare administration, proba-
tion, and psychiatric testing, the new municipal courts produced author-
itative social knowledge and delivered governance into the intimate de-
tails of everyday life.36
Willrich was aware that the Chicago Municipal Court was an exper-
iment in eugenicist jurisprudence and expansive social control.  Yet eu-
genics, sterilization, and permanent detention are relegated to a footnote 
in Criminal Municipal Courts, while the text simply notes that not all 
reforms were benign.37
For many these days, progressive denotes a certain egalitarianism.  
The progressiveness of Progressive Era municipal reforms was predi-
cated on corporate efficiency, management, and strengthening mecha-
nisms of urban control; in reality, it mimicked most other initiatives of 
the era in centering the behavior of poor people as that which had to be 
reformed.38  Municipal reform, including municipal court reform, was 
the work of groups like the National Municipal League and the  

33 See Natapoff, supra note 5, at 992 (citing MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS:
SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO, at xxvi (2003)). 
34 See JOEL E. BLACK, STRUCTURING POVERTY IN THE WINDY CITY 1242 (2019).  It is 
worth noting that there are indications that this expansion of local courts happened earlier in the 
South as a response to emancipation.  See BRYAN WAGNER, DISTURBING THE PEACE: BLACK
CULTURE AND THE POLICE POWER AFTER SLAVERY 131 (2009).
35 BLACK, supra note 34, at 12. 
36 WILLRICH, supra note 33, at xxix. 
37 Natapoff, supra note 5, at 992 & n.164. 
38 See Samuel P. Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era, 
55 PAC. NW. Q. 157, 162 (1964). 
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American Judicature Society.39  It was the work of individuals like  
Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound, who championed the  
Chicago Municipal Court experiment, and whose interest in efficient 
human management led him to associate with prominent members of 
the Nazi Party.40  Professor Samuel Hays summarizes the municipal 
movement as an attempt by upper-class, advanced professional, and 
large business groups to take formal political power from the previously 
dominant lower- and middle-class elements so that they might advance 
their own conceptions of desirable public policy.41  These antidemo-
cratic strains of municipal reform in the Progressive era were apparent 
not only in the courts, but also in the push for weak mayors and power-
ful city managers.42
The reforms that prefigured the modern municipal court constituted 
an entrenchment and expansion of the repression of the commons, not 
a democratic intervention.  In 1748, Montesquieu explained that [i]n 
the exercise of the Police, it is rather the magistrate who punishes and 
[t]he actions of the Police are quick; they are exercised over things 
which return every day.43  This is not substantively distinct from the 
vision of progressive reformers like Pound and Chicago Judge Harry 
Olson who sought flexible and prompt everyday justice to combat the 
perceived dangers of multiracial urban centers.44  Herbert Harleys 1913
address to the Municipal League noted that England has not yet ap-
plied the principles which underlie her judicial establishment to the con-
crete problems of a large city as thoroughly as has Chicago.45  For 
Montesquieu and for the Progressives, human beings were a danger to 
the peace as much as they were democratic subjects.  The municipal 
court is the efficient managerial response to the perceived problem of 
modern urban society  its people. 

39 See, e.g., id. at 158; Success of Organized Courts as Exemplified by the History of Municipal 
Courts in Chicago and Other Cities, 1 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOCY 133, 134 (1918). 
40 See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLERS AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND
THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 15 (2017); Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the 
Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV. 302, 314 (1913); Peter Rees, Nathan Roscoe Pound and the Nazis, 
60 B.C. L. REV. 1313, 131723 (2019); Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: Eugenic  
Jurisprudence and the Socialization of American Law, 19001930, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 63, 76
(1998). 
41 Hays, supra note 38, at 162. 
42 See id. at 159. 
43 2 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. XXVI, 
ch. 24, at 168 (Thomas Nugent trans., rev. ed. 1905) (1748) (emphasis omitted). 
44 See BLACK, supra note 34, at 1242. 
45 Herbert Harley, The Model Municipal Court, 3 NATL MUN. REV. 57, 63 (1914). 
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III. UNDERSTANDING MUNICIPAL COURTS TODAY
[T]he posture that the municipality of Ferguson assumed toward its 
black residents was that of a sovereign toward its subjects who existed 
outside the compact of consensual governance. 
 Minkah Makalani46
In Natapoffs view, local courts today are best understood as the 
product of the tense relationship between criminal justice and local de-
mocracy.47  The resultant informality and due process concerns are 
quite serious but can be mitigated by available reforms.48  Democracy 
and its variations do a lot of work in Natapoffs analysis.  To be sure, 
municipal courts cannot be discussed without reference to democratic 
ideals and democratic institutions.  And, as she notes, a cohort of polit-
ically diverse scholars today are interested in local democracy and crim-
inal justice reform.49  But there is an overarching lack of clarity about 
how Natapoff herself defines local democracy.  The concepts of par-
ticipation and inclusion appear briefly but not as democracy modifi-
ers.50  Pluralism is absent.  This uncertainty matters if we are con-
cerned with what form of democratic interaction is available to the 
victims of municipal courts.  Is it external to the apparatus or inter-
nal? Is Natapoffs democracy defined by suffrage and periodic munici-
pal elections, or is it something more? 
When Natapoff describes specific sites of municipal court reform, 
the question of whether this is in fact democracy remains unanswered.51
There are certainly municipal courts currently in a limited progressive 
reform cycle  courts that are experimenting (not democratically) with 
greater due process and offering more diversion programs, more educa-
tion, and less time in jail.  Historically, this has always been the case.  
Today, if the winds blow correctly, courts and legal activists even receive 
grants for these things.  But the examples Natapoff provides are not 
convincing.  She writes, for example, that courts can be a de facto fo-
rum for decriminalization.52  Wisconsin serves as her example here, and 
she refers to a municipal judge from the affluent white town of Pleasant 

46 Minkah Makalani, Black Lives Matter and the Limits of Formal Black Politics, 3 S. ATL. Q.
529, 539 (2017). 
47 Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1033. 
48 See id. at 104346.  
49 See, e.g., id. at 1030 & n.405 (citing Symposium, Democratizing Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U.
L. REV. 1367 (2017)). 
50 See id. at 1023, 1034 n.433. 
51 See, e.g., id. at 989, 991, 1023. 
52 Id. at 993. 
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Prairie.53  But Wisconsins civil ordinance system looks entirely differ-
ent if one takes a thirty-minute drive north.  In 2017, the most recent 
year with available data, municipal courts were responsible for 14,683
days spent in the Milwaukee County House of Corrections.54
Professor Natapoff also commends the Seattle Municipal Court,55 a 
court constantly in the midst of progressive reforms, but also a court 
deeply committed to caging poor people.  Whatever municipal court pi-
lot programs Seattle announces, the Citys true intentions are demon-
strated by its fiscal planning.  Seattle maintains a ten-year contract with 
King County that promises to fill a minimum number of jail beds  
currently 240 per year and increasing.56
Understanding the history of local courts as rooted in the tension 
between criminal justice and the maintenance of the settler-colonial 
state provides an alternative, antidemocratic possibility for understand-
ing the informality and lack of legal rigor that define local courts to-
day.  Professor Achille Mbembe notes that in the colonial context, Im-
provisation, ad hoc reactions in the face of unforeseen situations, and, 
very often, informality and weak institutionalization were the rule.57  A 
coherent and consistent local justice system is the enemy of political im-
peratives.  It may seem extreme to posit that this flexible maintenance 
of the racial and class order remains the primary objective of local crim-
inal courts, but it is difficult to support an alternative proposition.  The 
modern criminal municipal court is decidedly unmodern.  It does not 
even attempt to cloak its coercive activities as scientific or risk based.58
This antidemocratic understanding speaks also to the experience of 
my clients.  After public education, the municipal court is the state ap-
paratus with which my clients have the most contact  the city is the 
State in daily life.  But this contact, whether carceral or disruptive, is 
by any definition antidemocratic.  It is a fugitive relationship predicated 
on avoidance techniques  dont drive on that street, dont walk with 
that friend, dont go to that appointment.  As Professors Amy Lerman 
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53 See id. (citing Richard A. Ginkowski, Beyond Ferguson: Community-Based or Cash-Register 
Justice?, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2018, at 14, 1719). 
54 Gretchen Schuldt, W. Allis Leads Rest of County in Muni Court Lockups, WIS. JUST.
INITIATIVE (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.wjiinc.org/blog/w-allis-leads-rest-of-county-in-muni-
court-lockups [https://perma.cc/VK9H-AV5Y]. 
55 See Natapoff, supra note 5, at 986. 
56 OFF. OF THE CITY CLERK, INTERLOCAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN KING COUNTY AND
THE CITY OF SEATTLE FOR JAIL SERVICES 52 (2011), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~public/ 
meetingrecords/2011/pse20110817_2b.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4PB-WE6F]. 
57 ACHILLE MBEMBE, NECROPOLITICS 26 (2019). 
58 For a discussion of modern policing and the risk-based society, see generally RICHARD V.
ERICSON & KEVIN D. HAGGERTY, POLICING THE RISK SOCIETY (1997).  
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and Vesla Weaver demonstrate in Arresting Citizenship, a life spent nec-
essarily avoiding the coercive state reduces democratic political engage-
ment generally.59
The concept of citizenship clearly lurks behind much of this discus-
sion  the fragile order created and regulated by local justice systems 
was always primarily for the benefit of the white citizen, and the white 
citizen was shaped through these interactions.  Taken a step further, this 
is Professor Joel Olsons white democracy, a politics so steeped in 
whiteness as identity and anti-Blackness as a project that it is impossible 
to imagine multiracial participation or inclusion within it.60  The system 
instead creates and recreates racialized subjects relegated to an external 
position.  This is not mere hyperbole; municipal courts strip my clients 
of a range of things associated with citizenship in the United States: 
employment, guns, houses, children, the right to be present in a neigh-
borhood, and the ability to stay in this country. 
For Natapoff, the modern municipal court functions as an ascertain-
able democratic construct  a court of law.61  I believe todays munici-
pal court is better understood as a component of the modern police bu-
reaucracy.62  Popular discussions on the origins of expansive law 
enforcement in the United States have rightly focused on slave patrols 
and strike-breaking, but the seeds of modern policing are present in the 
very concepts of peace, order, and security.63  The Justice of the Peace 
and his constables are largely indistinguishable from the municipal 
judge, clerk, and police sergeant moonlighting as a court bailiff.  The 
distinctions lie only in the reach and firepower of the apparatus that 
extends outside the courtroom. 
As a part of police bureaucracy, municipal courts serve multiple dis-
cernible purposes.  The first of these is the expansion of the scope of 
police power.  They expand the scope of power by extending police in-
teractions in both time and space.64  There is paperwork in the form of 
summonses and compliance letters.  There are phone calls to clerks, trips 
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59 See AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE
DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 20130 (2014). 
60 See generally JOEL OLSON, ABOLITION OF WHITE DEMOCRACY 3163 (2004). 
61 See Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1012. 
62 I am appreciative of Professor Mark Neocleouss caution that we may wish to put some limits 
around what we mean when we talk about the police.  See generally Mark Neocleous, Theoretical 
Foundations of the New Police Science, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE 17, 2239 (Markus D. 
Dubber & Mariana Valverde eds., 2006). I do not intend here to employ a limitless concept of 
police  Foucauldian or otherwise.  The point is, rather, that municipal courts are the real police 
or the police as an institution.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 213 (Alan  
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975). 
63 See KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA
2349 (3d ed. 2015). 
64 For an in-depth discussion of state power and the unequal distribution of time, see generally
ELIZABETH F. COHEN, THE POLITICAL VALUE OF TIME (2018). 
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to court, and often nights in a cage.  Routine street-level encounters with 
police officers over minor ordinance violations carry the very real po-
tential for death.  At the same time, they carry the near certainty of lost 
time and continuing disruptions of daily life.  
Just as importantly, municipal courts legitimize police activity.  Po-
licing is a coercive project, but the maintenance of order requires the 
management of consent and, of course, education about life and law and 
order.65  There must be an expressive component of the police bureau-
cracy.  Municipal courts fill this void.  This is different from saying that 
police enforce municipal ordinances and courts then punish any viola-
tions.  Rather, I argue, individual officers engage in largely unfettered 
discretion to disrupt daily life.  Municipal codes and municipal courts in 
turn explain these disruptions not only to the defendant, but also to the 
community at large.  Officer Darren Wilson would likely have told  
Michael Brown to get the fuck out of the street whether or not there 
was a jaywalking ordinance, but the ordinance and the potential for its 
enforcement cast a shadow of legitimacy across the lethal interaction.66
Warrants themselves remain the most underappreciated aspect of the 
municipal courts expressive role in police bureaucracy.  It is not uncom-
mon, even after the purported municipal court reforms in Missouri, for 
a community in this state to average more than one warrant per house-
hold.  In 2019, the City of Florissant issued 29,017 warrants in a com-
munity consisting of approximately 19,700 households, and the City of 
Pagedale issued 3,028 in a community consisting of approximately 1,400
households.67   The existence of a municipal warrant effectively means 
that one is subject to state capture at any moment.  It modifies behavior 
in a myriad of ways.  My clients accept default judgments in civil cases, 
avoid voting at municipal buildings, and alter their driving routes, to 
name just a few examples.  At the same time, these warrants legitimize 
virtually all police activity in Black neighborhoods.  In communities 
with as many warrants as households, even the most egregiously pre-
textual and unlawful traffic stop will likely end with a wanted person 
being taken into custody. 
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66 Jessica Lussenhop, Dorian Johnson, Witness to Michael Brown Shooting, Sues Ferguson and 
Darren Wilson, RIVERFRONT TIMES (May 6, 2015, 2:00 PM), https://www. 
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67 See MO. CTS., MISSOURI JUDICIAL REPORT SUPPLEMENT: FISCAL 2019, at 30102
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I have stayed away from two major intersecting critiques of todays 
municipal justice systems.  The first notes that ever-increasing interac-
tions with police increase the risk of death.68  The second notes that 
municipal justice systems engage in racialized wealth extraction, thereby 
incentivizing increased interactions with police.69  I agree entirely with 
these points and will certainly not improve on Professor Devon  
Carbados work in this regard.  But even as I have actively litigated 
issues of excessive fines and fees over the past six years, I have never 
entirely believed that local court revenue generation is the motivation 
for repressive policing.  The assumption of many, not including Car-
bado, seems to be that if localities make money from issuing warrants 
then they must be doing so to make money.  I fear this is a misunder-
standing of racial capitalism.  The control is the point, and the revenue 
often goes directly back into the maintenance of policing.
CONCLUSION
As Criminal Municipal Courts nears its end, Natapoff remarks that 
[w]hile it is tempting to conclude that the pathologies of municipal 
courts outweigh their redeeming qualities, it is too soon to give up on 
them.70  In terms of scholarly debate, she may be correct that it is too 
soon.  A hundred years into municipal courts history, her article is the 
first comprehensive description of and analytic framework for the mod-
ern criminal municipal court phenomenon in the United States.71  It is 
worth thinking briefly about this absence of attention.  Why havent 
scholars talked about municipal courts? 
I must admit that in recent years I have stayed away from discussing 
municipal courts even as I continue to work in them and against them.  
They are dreadfully boring  housed in police station basements, city 
hall conference rooms, and middle school gymnasiums.  Defendants 
stand in lines waiting to beg judges for extra time to make some money 
or complete community service.  Clerks scribble warrant on thin file 
folders.  The courts produce misery for millions, but by and large it is 
the sort of bureaucratic misery that has not been of significant interest 
to scholars in the last half a century.72
That municipal courts are local and mundane should not lead us to 
mark their abolition as less urgent.  Structural violence has popularly 
come to mean the states capacity to do shockingly vicious things.  I 
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69 See Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 554 (2017). 
70 Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1046. 
71 Id. at 969.  In the 1960s, a few scholars were critical of specific local court systems.  See, e.g., 
T.E. Lauer, Prolegomenon to Municipal Court Reform in Missouri, 31 MO. L. REV. 69, 69 (1966); 
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sometimes fear the intensive focus on such violence is to the exclusion 
of comprehending the states lurking capacity for violence embodied in 
the day-to-day intrusions discussed above.  My desire here has been to 
surface the mundane that accompanies the visibly obscene in the 
broader structures of police bureaucracy. 
I understand that for all of us interested in building a better world, 
there is a certain appeal to the idea of local structures.  The critics of 
the carceral state share a focus on local organizing, local activism, and 
local politics.  But for many of us this is about tactics (available targets) 
and power building, and not a belief that the municipal corporation and 
its apparatuses are somehow more democratic or less repressive. 
This fetishization of local systems and their transformative capacity 
has real-world consequences that are destructive to the work of abolition 
and liberation.  In 2014, Ferguson, Missouri, became an international 
news story.  For many of those I love, and for myself, everything 
changed.  Incredible leaders were born in that struggle and new energy 
was injected to social movements across the United States.  Terrible sac-
rifices were made: a dear friend horribly injured at a protest, my client 
Bassem Masri now dead, and my client Josh Williams still locked up all 
these years later.  Natapoffs contention that municipal court corrup-
tion . . . helped trigger the Ferguson uprising does not ring true to these 
memories.73  We chanted, We do this for Mike Brown!  But what is 
true is that, in the face of an unwavering commitment by local govern-
ments to white power and police impunity, significant reduction or abo-
lition of municipal courts was among the only likely short-term victories.  
The interest-convergences that made this a reality are deserving of their 
own article, but a perfect storm of circumstance put the Missouri mu-
nicipal court system under enormous scrutiny and pressure. 
Predictably, Missouri municipal judges and other status quo defend-
ers of the municipal court system pointed glowingly to the very same 
benefits of democratic municipalism embraced by Natapoff.  Still, this 
is not why we lost.  We lost because of the reformers who saw the mo-
ment as teeming with possibilities for democracy and justice experimen-
tation.  They made impassioned pleas to give our courts the chance to 
become innovative, problem-solving . . . municipal courts.74  They 
won.  In 2019, St. Louis municipal courts issued about 150,000 new mu-
nicipal court warrants.75
Reforms, no matter how serious or how imaginative, can never 
change the nature of the arrangement, which is control.  It finds its level.  
Municipal courts, as we are fond of saying, are not broken.  They are a 
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coercive apparatus perfectly suited to limiting the mobility (physical, 
economic, and political) of racialized subjects.  They will produce what 
they are designed to produce until they are abolished. 
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